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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers, then the fourth largest 
investment bank in the United States, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
Later, some would claim that the collapse of Lehman Brothers (“Lehman”)
into bankruptcy sparked the international financial crisis of 2009.1 
Lehman was one of the largest financial services firms in the world, with
headquarters in New York and regional headquarters in London and
Tokyo.  Lehman offices were spread around the world—throughout
North America, Europe, the Middle East, Latin America and the Asia
Pacific region.2  As a result, its bankruptcy would prove to be a complex
and lengthy process with global ramifications.  
Lehman operated in over forty countries and had more than 650 legal 
entities outside of the United States.3  The bankruptcy filing resulted in
over seventy-five separate proceedings, with more than sixteen 
administrators playing multiple roles.4  Proceedings were adjudicated by 
tribunals in nine countries, and the law in each country varied widely.5 
For example, the applicable law included the Dutch Bankruptcy Act, the 
German Insolvency Code, Swiss Law on Banks and Savings, Civil
Rehabilitation Law of Tokyo, French Financial and Monetary Code,
Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, Singapore Companies Act, and the 
Australian Corporations Act.  Accordingly, coordinating an international 
bankruptcy of this size and scope would be a daunting task.   
1. E.g., MARK WILLIAMS, UNCONTROLLED RISK: LESSONS OF LEHMAN BROTHERS 
AND HOW SYSTEMIC RISK CAN STILL BRING DOWN THE WORLD FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
(2010); JOSEPH TIBMAN, THE MURDER OF LEHMAN BROTHERS: AN INSIDER’S LOOK AT
THE GLOBAL MELTDOWN (2009).
2. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Cross Border Insolvency Protocol for the Lehman
Brothers Group of Companies, 1 (May 12, 2009), available at http://www.lehman-docket. 
com (select “Key Documents”) [hereinafter Protocol].
3. Alvarez & Marsal Holdings LLC. Lehman Brothers International Protocol
Proposal, 4 (Feb. 11 2009), available at http:// www.lehman-docket.com [hereinafter
Proposal].
4. Administrators were located in the United Kingdom, Japan, Switzerland, Germany,
Australia, Korea, Bermuda, the Philippines, and the Netherlands.  Proposal, supra note 3, 
at 5.
 5. Proposal, supra note 3, at 18–26. 
464
ALTMAN ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/26/2011 3:51 PM     
  
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
[VOL. 12:  463, 2011] The Lehman Brothers Insolvency
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
To facilitate the process, interested parties entered into a private 
agreement: the Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol for the Lehman
Brothers Group of Companies (the “Lehman Protocol”).6  Protocols in
international bankruptcies are not a new tool. The Lehman Protocol, 
however, was novel in the number of countries which participated and in
the amount of assets it governed.  There was little precedent which could 
effectively be applied to a bankruptcy on such a global scale.  
The Lehman Protocol was ground breaking in a number of ways and
this article will explore that protocol, showing how it sought to address 
the unique problems arising from international insolvency proceedings. 
This article will also follow the international bankruptcy laws and
guidelines on which the Lehman Protocol is based to show that the 
theory underlying the Lehman Protocol is modified universalism. 
Modified universalism is one of a number of theoretical bankruptcy
models which could potentially govern an international bankruptcy.  The 
two main models are universalism and territorialism, and proponents of 
each argue fiercely over which is the better model.  The adoption of 
modified universalism by private parties in a protocol may reflect 
modified universalism’s wide-spread appeal and success.
A protocol is a private agreement which parties in an international
bankruptcy enter into of their own accord.  Protocols are especially
important for coordinating the multiple proceedings in different countries 
that arise as a result of an international corporate group, such as Lehman, 
filing bankruptcy.7  The main goal of a protocol is to maximize efficiency
and minimize dispute among all parties: debtors, creditors, and tribunals 
worldwide.8 
The term “international bankruptcy” refers to a number of situations— 
when the debtor has a presence in more than one country (such as in the 
case of Lehman), when a debtor is domestic but creditors exist in foreign 
countries, or when the debtor is foreign and creditors are domestic.  On 
the most basic level, two major problems arise in international 
insolvencies: (1) determining which forum will govern the proceedings, 
6. See generally Protocol, supra note 2. 
7. HON. SAMUEL L. BUFFORD, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW
50 (2009).
8. Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman, Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation 
Protocols, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 587, 590 (1998). 
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and (2) determining what law will be applied in that forum.9  Theoretically, 
the principles underlying a domestic bankruptcy can be transferred to an 
international bankruptcy.  However, conflicts arise in international settings
because substantive and procedural bankruptcy laws vary between 
countries.10  Further issues arise due to language differences, differences 
between common law and civil code systems, differences in litigation 
culture, different time zones, different resources available to courts, and
weak bankruptcy infrastructures in some countries.11  Protocols attempt to 
harmonize the proceedings by providing a framework to guide the
parties and courts.12 
The mechanisms driving international bankruptcy are important in
today’s world because multinational businesses with extensive global 
connections are thriving.13  Prior to its bankruptcy filing, Lehman was a 
prototypical example of a thriving multinational corporation.  International 
trade and investment has been stimulated by new economic markets, the
reduction of barriers to foreign trade, and advancing technology.14  As  
the world becomes more globalized and technological advances break 
down distance barriers, companies will act on increasingly international 
scales. Inevitably, this will lead to bankruptcies on similarly international 
scales—the Lehman bankruptcy.15  An understanding of the complex
problems arising from international bankruptcy and the possible 
solutions is vital to the continued development of the global economy. 
Before the Lehman Protocol can be analyzed in depth, some general 
principles underlying bankruptcy law, both domestic and international, 
must be identified.  An international bankruptcy should ideally lead to 
the same predictable results as a bankruptcy filed within a single country. 
This has not, however, always been the case.  Although there are a 
number of widely recognized goals of bankruptcy, bankruptcy law and
policy vary widely from country to country.16  For example, the proceedings
 9. Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2531, 2532 (1996). 
10. Every country has its own bankruptcy code, except Ghana.  See Samuel L. Bufford,
Global Venue Controls Are Coming: A Reply to Professor LoPucki, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J.
105, 109 (2005). 
11. BUFFORD, supra note 7, at 548. 
12. Id. at 589. 
13. Id.
 14. BOB WESSELS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN BANKRUPTCY AND
INSOLVENCY MATTERS 201 (2009). 
15. See Kent Anderson, The Cross-Border Insolvency Paradigm: A Defense of the
Modified Universal Approach Considering the Japanese Experience, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 679, 679–80 (2000). See also Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy:
In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2177 (2000). 
16. WESSELS, supra note 14, at 17.  Some examples of these differences include: 
(1) Some countries treat creditors with a “right of set off” as having a secured claim, while
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in the Lehman filing were subject to the laws of nine different countries, 
all encompassing different public policy and social mores.17 
A lack of predictability in cross-border insolvencies hinders the free 
flow of capital among counties and creates a disincentive to investment
across borders.18  As such, predictable results for all parties involved is
one bankruptcy goal generally accepted by all countries.  In addition to 
predictability, there are other principles of bankruptcy law that are 
accepted by individual countries, yet which are difficult to accomplish in 
international bankruptcies. One example is the maximization of assets
for all creditors. 
The maximization of assets available for distribution to creditors is
one of the most important goals of modern bankruptcy.19 When 
insolvency strikes, one of the initial reactions of creditors is to grab
whatever assets they can lay their hands on.20  Without the intervention
of bankruptcy law, this “feeding frenzy” mentality leads individual 
creditors to seize assets in inefficient ways, such as quickly auctioning 
off the debtor’s assets below their value.21  The goal of insolvency law in 
the United States and other countries is to overcome the difficulty of
enforcing collective action among creditors and preventing individuals 
from acting in ways that unnecessarily reduce assets available to all 
others treat them as having an unsecured claim. See PHILIP R. WOOD, MAPS OF WORLD
FINANCIAL LAW 38–43 (3d ed. 1997). (2) Some countries (e.g., the United States) give 
creditors with a tort claim equal status to creditors with commercial claims, while other 
countries give tort creditors a lower status.  Further, in some countries, tort creditors who
have not won a judgment before the bankruptcy is filed have no claim, while others 
allow claims even in the absence of a judgment.  See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in
International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 709 
n.62 (1999). (3) In some countries, employee creditors are the highest priority creditors
in the bankruptcies of their employers, which furthers the substantive policy of encouraging 
employees to extend credit to their employers in difficult times.  Other countries employee’s
creditors are not given any priority, making it unlikely that employees will lend to their
employers. Id. at 710. 
17. For example, the French insolvency system presumes that a business should be 
reorganized, rather than liquidated.  The primary goals of French insolvency law are the 
survival of businesses and the discharge of their liabilities. The payment of creditors is
only secondary, and is often not accomplished. See Richard L. Koral & Marie-Christine 
Sordino, The New Bankruptcy Reorganization Law in France: Ten Years Later, 70 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 437, 453 (1996).  In contrast, the German insolvency system presumes that a 
business should be liquidated.  Bufford, supra note 10, at 112. 
18. WESSELS, supra note 14, at 17. 
19. Id. at 14. 
20. Id.
21. Id.
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creditors.22  While all countries accept the theoretical need for collective
action among creditors, they do not agree on the best method of
maximizing assets.23  This disagreement creates inefficiency when the 
assets of one debtor are subject to the varying laws of different countries.
Another fundamental principle of bankruptcy law is the equitable 
treatment of similarly situated creditors.24  This idea is captured by the
concept of pari passu, which requires that all creditors of a certain level
of priority should receive the same proportionate distribution of assets as 
all other creditors on that same level.25  The opposite of the pari passu
concept is the distribution of assets to creditors based on characteristics
other than their type of claim—for example, distribution based on 
personal favoritism.26  While the equitable treatment of creditors is often 
attained when bankruptcy proceedings are within one country, the 
principle can break down on an international level.27  Countries inevitably
give preference to certain claims for social and political reasons—claims 
of domestic creditors are often favored over the claims of similarly
situated foreign creditors.28  For example, in Mexico, government tax
debts are given higher priority than the claims of foreign secured creditors.29 
These substantive differences between laws unfortunately can lead to 
inequitable treatment of creditors in international bankruptcies.  
Differing treatment of creditors in an international bankruptcy is not 
limited to treatment of their claims.  Often issues arise regarding notice— 
the substantive law of a country may not require that foreign creditors be 
given the same level of notice offered to domestic creditors. This
unquestionably puts foreign creditors at a disadvantage when it comes to
filing their claims.  Foreign creditors and administrators may also be
denied equal access to a country’s tribunals.  Furthermore, the simple 
22. Id. 
23. For example, the bankruptcy law of almost every country includes the power to
“avoid,” or nullify, certain transactions made by the debtor before he filed for bankruptcy.
Westbrook, supra note 9, at 2531.  The purpose of avoidance is to regain assets that the 
debtor owned before his bankruptcy filing in order to maximize the estate.  However,
jurisdictions differ in which types of pre-petition transactions they allow to be avoided.
This can lead to disparate methods of maximizing an estate.
24. WESSELS, supra note 14, at 16. 
25. Id.
 26. Without the pari passu concept, the party responsible for distributing the debtor’s
estate would choose to repay creditors with whom he has a close relationship (e.g. family, 
friends, vendors critical to the debtor’s continuing operation) in full before repaying other 
creditors.
 27. WESSELS, supra note 14, at 17. 
28. Id.
29. Id. at 18–19. 
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differences among countries in procedural law, as opposed to substantive
law, can result in inefficiency and disputes.30 
These issues make administration of an international bankruptcy 
inefficient and often unfair.  In a bankruptcy the size of Lehman’s, the 
aforementioned problems could cause proceedings to continue for an
unnecessary amount of time and harm the interests of all parties involved. 
Because these widely recognized problems may be alleviated or worsened
depending on what theoretical model of international bankruptcy law 
applies, the debate over what model is best is heated.31  The two major
approaches are universalism and territorialism, and each side has its own
proponents. 
Part II explains the competing theories underlying bankruptcy systems: 
universalism and territorialism.  Part III details various statutory solutions to
international bankruptcy problems.  Next, Part IV analyzes the provisions of
the Lehman Protocol in depth.  Part V then examines the precedent upon 
which the Lehman Protocol relies. Part VI assesses potential threats to 
the Protocol’s success.  This leads to Part VII, which contains suggestions 
for future protocols. Finally, Part VIII concludes. 
II. FROM TERRITORIALISM TO UNIVERSALISM: A SPECTRUM
Universalism and territorialism are at opposite ends of the spectrum of 
theoretical approaches to international bankruptcy.32  Universalism is the
idea that the home country of a multinational debtor, for example the
United States in the case of Lehman, should have worldwide jurisdiction
over its bankruptcy.33  In contrast, territorialism, the traditional approach, is
the idea that the assets of a multinational debtor should be governed
completely by the country in which they are located, and the debtor’s 
home country should not have any authority outside of its borders.34 The 
current state of international bankruptcy law is a system of territoriality, 
30. Id. at 17. 
 31. For an illustration, see the exchange of publications between the Honorable Samuel 
L. Bufford and Professor Lynn M. LoPucki; for example Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for
Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2218 
(2000) and Bufford, supra note 10, at 108.  See also LoPucki, supra note 16, at 696; 
Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 1, 27 (1997); Liza Perkins, A Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-Border Corporate
Insolvencies, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 787 (2000). 
32. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 696. 
33. See id. at 2216. 
34. Bufford, supra note 10, at 108. 
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and has been described as “the inverse of multinational cooperation.”35 
Some legal scholars, for example, the Honorable Samuel L. Bufford, 
argue that the only solution to the current problems facing international 
insolvencies is a shift towards universalism, and the Lehman Protocol’s
reliance on modified universalism principles seems to suggest the same.
A. Territorialism 
Under territorialism, each country seizes the debtor’s assets which are 
located within its borders and conducts a separate bankruptcy proceeding to
divide those assets among local creditors according to local law.36  A
representative is appointed for each creditor filing in a jurisdiction.37 
In the Lehman Protocol, these representatives are termed “Official
Representatives.”38  No proceeding in an individual country affects
proceedings in any other country, and international cooperation exists 
only to the extent that parties actively pursue such cooperation.39 
Unfortunately, even where cooperation would be beneficial and is
desired by the representatives, cooperation may not be possible if the 
laws of an individual country do not provide for it.
Proponents40 of territorialism argue that the current system presents no 
serious problems.41  When a company’s insolvency is confined to one
country, a positive aspect of territorialism is that corporate entities in 
other jurisdictions remain unaffected.42  And when a company is insolvent 
in multiple countries, private protocols, such as the Lehman protocol, 
provide for international cooperation.  Professor LoPucki, a fierce 
proponent of territorialism, recognizes that representatives may be
unable to agree on a protocol, but claims that there are no examples of
cases where this has occurred.43
 35. LoPucki, supra note 31, at 2219. 
36. Lore Unt, International Relations and International Insolvency Cooperation:
Liberalism, Institutionalism, and Transnational Legal Dialogue, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L 
BUS. 1037, 1040 (1997). 
37. LoPucki, supra note 31, at 2219. 
38. Protocol, supra note 2, at 1. 
39. Unt, supra note 36, at 1040. 
40. When identifying proponents of territorialism, the question arises of which parties 
benefit most from the doctrine.   Originally, territorialism was thought to benefit local creditors. 
Westbrook, supra note 9, at 2532.  However, as the bankruptcy laws of many countries 
have changed to become less discriminatory against foreign creditors, territorialism began to
benefit “large and sophisticated” creditors in addition to local creditors. Id.
 41. LoPucki, supra note 31, at 2219. 
42. Id.
43. LoPucki’s article may predate any such examples of cases where parties have
failed to agree on a protocol.  Unfortunately, such cases presently exist.
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Critics of territorialism point to its numerous disadvantages.44  First,  
territorialism increases the costs of an international bankruptcy because
the need to file separately in each country creates duplicative expenses.45 
Second, successful reorganization is more difficult under territorialism 
because it decreases liquidation values and makes coordination of cases 
more complicated.46  Third, distribution of assets to similarly situated 
creditors is unequal and unpredictable, which increases the cost of 
capital because the possibility of bankruptcy would lead to uncertain 
results.47  Finally, under territorialism debtors and creditors can act
strategically to advance their private interests while injuring the general
interests of creditors.48 
B. Universalism
Under universalism, the bankruptcy of one multinational debtor would 
result in only one proceeding, held in the debtor’s “home country,” 
under a single body of substantive and procedural bankruptcy law.49 
The single proceeding would distribute all of the debtor’s assets to all
creditors worldwide.50  Officials in all countries would be obligated to
enforce this single court order in their home country.51 
Proponents of universalism cite as its main advantage the maximization 
of a debtor’s assets.  Universalism maximizes assets because the value of
assets is highest when transaction costs are low.52  Multiple bankruptcy 
proceedings substantially increase transaction costs,53 and those costs
diminish the assets available for creditors.54  Other advantages of
universalism include more efficient allocation of capital, reduced
administrative costs as a result of fewer proceedings, higher possibility
of successful reorganization, increased liquidation value, and greater
44. See Bufford, supra note 10, at 114. 
 45. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to International Default, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 2276, 2309 (2000). 
46. Guzman, supra note 15, at 2202–04. 
47. See Unt, supra note 36, at 1043. 
48. Westbrook, supra note 45, at 2309. 
49. Unt, supra note 36, at 1040. 
50. Id.
 51. LoPucki, supra note 31, at 2220. 
52. See Rasmussen, supra note 31, at 27. 
53. Consider the cost of duplicative proceedings, the cost of translators at proceedings 
where parties speak different languages, and the cost of educating courts of the law of 
other jurisdictions involved in proceedings.  Bufford, supra note 10, at 111. 
54. Rasmussen, supra note 31, at 27. 
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certainty for all parties involved.55  Further, similarly situated creditors
would be treated equally, regardless of their nationality. 
Critics of universalism point out that the theory leaves many practical
questions unanswered.  For example, when a multinational company’s
assets, headquarters, principal locations, and places of incorporation are 
all in different nations, how does one define a debtor’s home country?56 
If there is more than one possible home country, how is opportunistic 
forum shopping by a debtor prevented?57  And in the case of a corporate
group like Lehman, does “home country” refer to the entire corporate 
group’s headquarters, or does each corporation in the group have its own
home country?58  Proponents of universalism counter that in the “vast 
majority of cases, the home country will be easy to identify—making the
issue a minor question.”59  This response fails to satisfy critics.60 
LoPucki argues that even if it were simple to determine a debtor’s
home country, universalism as applied to an international corporate
group, such as Lehman, would lead to “anomalous results . . . which 
could be manipulated easily.”61  For example, if a subsidiary company 
only did business in the United States and its only international ties were 
that it was held by a larger corporation in Japan, the bankruptcy of the 
U.S. subsidiary would take place in Japan, despite the fact that all its 
assets were in the United States.62  A universalism system could be easily
manipulated by a company who, on the verge of bankruptcy, incorporated a
holding company in a different jurisdiction, making the new jurisdiction
the home country, and making the subsequent bankruptcy subject to the 
substantive bankruptcy law of that country.63  This represents the significant 
risk of forum shopping posed by a universalism system.64  Even under
55. See Anderson, supra note 15, at 688. 
56. LoPucki, supra note 31, at 2217. 
57. Id. at 2234. 
58. Id. at 2217. 
59. Guzman, supra note 15, at 2207. 
60. LoPucki argues that this assertion fails to take into account increasing globalization,
which results in multinational corporations, like Lehman, for which a home country
would be difficult to identify.  LoPucki, supra note 31, at 2227. 
61. Id. at 2230. 
62. Id.
63. This was done by Fruit of the Loom in the Cayman Islands in anticipation of
its bankruptcy filing in 1999.  In the current territorialism system, this action did not require 
the United States to surrender the company’s billion dollar assets to a Cayman Islands 
court.  But the result would have been different under a universalism system. See id. at 2230– 
31. 
64. Many differences in substantive bankruptcy law give rise to parties’ motivation 
to forum shop. For example, debtors would be motivated by laws in some countries that 
allow the debtor to remain in control of the company during reorganization, rather than requiring
appointment of a trustee, or laws that allow for approval of plans of reorganization over
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the current territorial system, large U.S. companies forum shop,65 even
though the motivating factors do not represent crucial gains to the 
companies.66 
In response to concerns about forum shopping, proponents of 
universalism suggest that only a few “modest” changes are needed to 
reduce the possibility of forum shopping,67  and that the Model Law and 
the European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings are scheduled to
make such changes in venue decisions.68 
Critics also point out that universalism presents a threat to individual
countries’ sovereignty, which demands that a country have complete 
control over matters within its borders (though modified universalism 
addresses concerns of sovereignty to some extent).69  LoPucki argues
that the failure of proponents of universalism to answer these
fundamental questions will cause any attempt at universalism to fail.70 
And where it is conceded that universalism is theoretically meritorious,
there is the question of whether a universalism system could realistically
ever be adopted. 
Critics question whether universalism could ever realistically be
adopted on a large scale, because countries which do not even authorize 
cooperation in the current territorialism system would be unlikely to
adopt a model requiring more extensive cooperation.71  Furthermore, if a
system of universalism were ever adopted, countries would have to
revise their bankruptcy laws in order to adapt to the new system.72  Such
a process would be incredibly expensive in terms of time and resources,
objections by creditors.  Creditors would be motivated by seeking countries whose laws 
give them priority over different groups of creditors.  See id. at 2234–35. 
65. As shown by the fact that 89% of large public companies who filed bankruptcy
between 1980 and 1997 were incorporated in Delaware, making Delaware the proper forum 
for their bankruptcy.  Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An 
Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Larger Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL 
L. REV. 967, 985 (1999). 
66. One hypothesis for the motivation to file bankruptcy in Delaware is that the state
has “successfully addressed the single biggest problem with Chapter 11 in recent years—
the inordinate time and expense of the reorganization process.”  David. A. Skeel, Jr.,
Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 
1, 28 (1998). 
67. Bufford, supra note 10, at 107. 
68. Id. 
69. Anderson, supra note 15, at 682. 
70. LoPucki, supra note 31, at 2223. 
71. Id. at 2219. 
72. Id. at 2222. 
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and could be met with resistance from individual countries.  And even if 
it were possible to adopt a universalism system, once such a system was 
adopted, it would be very difficult to make any changes or improvements to
it in the absence of a world government.73 
Additionally, though proponents of universalism claim that territorialism 
leads to unfairness, universalism itself could also lead to unfairness.  For
example, universalism might create uniform international bankruptcy
laws, but individual countries would continue to have different substantive
law in other areas, such as torts.74  If a creditor’s claim arises under one
country’s tort system, but the bankruptcy takes place in a debtor’s home 
country with a different tort system, the creditor’s claim could be 
unfairly affected by the home country’s substantive tort law.75 The
value of a tort claim in one country may be different from the value of 
the same claim in a different country.76 
C. Modified Universalism 
If territorialism and universalism are two ends of a spectrum, modified
universalism lies between them, though closer to pure universalism. 
Modified universalism coincides with the philosophy of universalism,
but still gives countries unilateral control over matters within its 
borders.77  Under modified universalism, there is no attempt to impose a 
single bankruptcy law upon all countries, but rather countries maintain 
their own bankruptcy law along with an emphasis on cooperation.78 
Modified universalism supports the idea that a non-home country court 
can open a secondary insolvency case, a “non-main” proceeding, that is 
separate from the main proceeding in the home country.79  Non-main  
proceedings would provide support to the main proceeding, such as 
when assets are located within the non-main proceeding’s jurisdiction.80 
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2225. 
75. For example, the settlement of claims for faulty breast implants in the Dow Corning 
bankruptcy gave foreign creditors lower payments than creditors in the United States for 
the same injuries, based on the idea that a claim those same injuries would be worth less
in a foreign jurisdiction. See id. at 2225–26. 
76. For example, as the result of an accident in Bhopal, India, Union Carbide Company 
was responsible for the deaths of 4,000 people. Their liability was estimated to be $3 billion 
when it seemed that the trial would take place in the United States.  However, when it 
became clear that the trial would be in India, the claims were settled for only $470 million. 
See id. at 2225; see also Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 809
n.81 (1990). 
77. Anderson, supra note 15, at 690. 
78. Id.
 79. Bufford, supra note 10, at 108–09. 
80. Id. at 112. 
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Where no such non-main proceeding is commenced, modified universalism 
remains identical to pure universalism.81 
The main advantage of modified universalism is that it features the 
efficiency of pure universalism while including the “flexibility and 
discretion” of territorialism.82  Modified universalism also does not require 
countries to give up their sovereignty to the same extent as pure 
universalism because it provides courts governing non-main proceedings
the power to refuse to turn over assets to main proceedings.83  Further, 
modified universalism can be more realistically implemented because it
does not require international conventions to enact a single body of law 
in all countries, and therefore allows countries to maintain their domestic 
legislation.84 
The Lehman Protocol reflects a modified universalism approach, and
contains provisions which attempt to address the problems of pure 
territorialism and pure universalism systems.  The creators of the 
Lehman Protocol, however, were not the first to turn to modified
universalism in an attempt to solve the problems plaguing international
insolvency.85  Prior to the creation of the Lehman Protocol, a number of
proposed statutory solutions based on modified universalism were
created.86  One of the most wide-reaching of these statutory solutions to 
international insolvency is the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvencies (Model Law).87 
81. Id. at 108–09. 
82. Anderson, supra note 15, at 691. 
83. Id.
84. See Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 
[1997] 28 Y.B. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l. Trade L. 318, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/442, reprinted
in 6 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 415 (1998) [hereinafter Guide to Enactment of Model Law]. 
85. For example, the United States adopted a modified universalism approach to 
international insolvency with its enactment of section 304 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code. 
86. Bufford, supra note 10, at 118. 
87. UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/436 
(May 30, 1997) [hereinafter Model Law]. 
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III. STATUTORY SOLUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL   
INSOLVENCY PROBLEMS
A. The UNCITRAL Model Law 
The Lehman Protocol appears to be largely based on a model law created
by UNCITRAL to deal with international bankruptcies.  UNCITRAL 
recognized the importance of efficiency and uniformity in international
bankruptcy law and in 1994 formed a working group to create functional 
guidelines for international bankruptcies.88  The solution that they
created is the Model Law.  The fundamental principle of the Model Law
is that it does not seek to change the substantive bankruptcy law of 
individual countries.89  Rather, the Model Law attempts to impose a
uniform procedural bankruptcy law among all countries.  The goal of the 
modifying procedural law is to allow equal access to substantive law for
all parties involved in an international bankruptcy.90  Under the Model
Law, all countries are free to decide their own substantive law, but they 
must allow foreign representatives “equal, simple, and fast access” to
that substantive law.91  Now UNCITRAL’s goal is for countries to adopt
the Model Law in a somewhat complete form.92  Because the Model 
Law is simply a model, countries may choose to adopt only portions of 
it, and change its terms as they see fit. Therefore, even if the Model Law
is widely adopted, there is still no guarantee of uniformity.93 
The Model Law’s approach to international bankruptcy has been
described as a modified universalism approach—or a universalism approach 
influenced by territorialism principles.94  While a pure universalism 
approach would seek to change individual countries’ substantive laws,
and a pure territorialism approach would leave both procedural and
substantive law decisions up to each individual country—the Model
Law’s approach is a balance between the two.95  The Model Law attempts
to cover a broad scope of procedural bankruptcy law, providing
guidance to creditors and administrators from the beginning to the end of
a bankruptcy.96  The Lehman Protocol appears to be based on the Model 
88. Matthew T. Cronin, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency:
Procedural Approach to a Substantive Problem, 24 J. CORP. L. 709, 710 (1999). 
89. Id.
90. See Guide to Enactment of Model Law, supra note 84, at 419. 
91. Cronin, supra note 88, at 710. 
92. Id.
93. Id. at 711. 
94. See id.; Lynn M. LoPucki, Global and Out of Control?, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J.
79, 86 (2005). 
95. See Cronin, supra note 88, at 711. 
96. Id. at 712. 
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Law, which further reflects the Protocol’s emphasis on modified
universalism principles. 
B. Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat 
The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat (Concordat)97 was created by 
the International Bar Association as part of an effort to form principles 
to guide international bankruptcy cases.98  The Concordat sets forth ten 
principles which can be applied to individual cases for a modified 
territorialism result.99  According to the Report which accompanies the
Concordat, the principles can be used in all types of insolvencies,
including proceedings which govern assets and claims on a “worldwide 
basis”—like in the case of the Lehman bankruptcy.100  Unlike the Model
Law, the Concordat was not written for countries to adopt as a statute. 
Rather, the Concordat was intended as “an interim step until treaties 
and/or statutes are adopted by commercial nations,” in recognition of the 
fact that an international treaty was necessary, but would be difficult to 
achieve and a long time in coming.101  Hence, the Concordat envisions
itself as being a useful tool in creating protocols.
Principle 1 of the Concordat states that in a bankruptcy where the 
debtor has “cross border connections,” there should be a single jurisdiction 
with primary responsibility for coordinating all insolvency proceedings 
relating to that debtor.102  This is an example of the Concordat’s tendencies
towards universalism.  The commentary on principle 1 cites the benefits
of having a primary administrative proceeding, which include enhanced
control of assets, increased business values, and fair treatment of
creditors.103  The commentary also recognizes that it will not always be
feasible to have only one main proceeding and allows for flexibility.
Flexibility is one of the primary goals of the Concordat, because such
varied situations arise in the international insolvency context that “one  
97. Committee J Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat, Sept. 17, 1995 [hereinafter
Concordat], reprinted in BUFFORD, supra note 7, at 651. 
98. Anne Nielsen et al., The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: Principles to 
Facilitate the Resolution of International Insolvencies, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 533 (1996). 
99. Id. at 537. 
100. Id. at 538. 
101. Id. at 537. 
102. Concordat, supra note 97, at 652. 
103. Id.
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rigid rule cannot solve all of them satisfactorily.”104  The Concordat
principles have formed the basis for a number of successful protocols.105 
For example, in In re Everfresh, a protocol based on the Concordat
was effective because it allowed the parties to specify early in the
proceedings how a wide range of matters would be dealt with by courts
in Canada and the United States.106  The Everfresh protocol specifically
addressed choice of law, choice of forum, claims resolution, and
avoidance action issues, among other issues.107 In re Everfresh provides
a demonstration of why a protocol based on a statutory model, like the
Concordat, is especially useful.  The creators of the Concordat carefully
considered situations which may arise in an international insolvency, and
used those situations as a guiding principle in creating a highly detailed
statutory system.  Basing a protocol on a preexisting model statute
allows protocols to be created more efficiently, because creators do not 
have to “reinvent the wheel.” 
IV. THE LEHMAN PROTOCOL
The Lehman Protocol is a response to a lack of applicable law which 
would be binding on all parties to the Lehman bankruptcy.  The lack of a 
universal system governing international bankruptcy often makes
protocols necessary to ensure efficiency in the proceedings and 
maximization of assets for all creditors.108  The creators of the Lehman 
Protocol recognized and documented this need in the Lehman Brothers 
International Protocol Proposal (“Proposal”) and in the introduction to
the Protocol.109  The Proposal provides helpful insight into the thought
process behind the creation of the Protocol and the motivation behind 
the document. 
The Proposal rests on the idea that because of the global nature of 
Lehman, Lehman’s assets and activities exist across multiple jurisdictions
and are subject to the different laws of each of those jurisdictions.  The
need for some mechanism to organize and facilitate the bankruptcy
process is described in the Proposal, which cites “chaos” from a barrage 
of filings; “melting” assets; lack of any asset or entity inventory; as well
 104. Nielsen, supra note 98, at 544–45. 
105. Including the Everfresh Protocol, the Livent Protocol, and the Loewen Protocol. 
See Wessels, supra note 14, at 183–88. 
106. See Order Approving the Stipulation Regarding Cross-Border Insolvency
Protocol, In re Everfresh Beverages, Inc., Case No. 95-B-45405-06 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 20, 1995).
107. Id.
108. See BUFFORD, supra note 7, at 506. 
109. Proposal, supra note 3, at 10. 
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as loss of accounting systems, operational support and resources.110  The
Proposal specifies that some system is needed to provide information 
and data sharing, identification and inventorying of assets, management 
of intercompany claims, and restitution of misdirected funds.111  In the  
introduction to the Protocol, two overarching goals are identified:       
(1) effective case management, and (2) consistency of judgments.112 
According to the Proposal, the ideal protocol would be based on
universalism, allowing the entire bankruptcy to be treated as a single 
unified case.113  This would “harmonize” the multiple filings filed 
globally.114  The Proposal notes, however, that as a practical matter, “no 
country adopts an unmodified universality approach, reserving some 
discretion to protect local interests, independence, sovereignty and
authority.”115 This is a reflection of the main concern expressed by 
critics of universalism: individual countries must sacrifice their sovereignty.116 
The Proposal therefore is modeled on the more realistic and practical
theory of modified universalism.117 
The Lehman Protocol, created with a basis in the principles expressed 
in the Proposal, has a number of overarching goals.  The most important
goals were to minimize costs and maximize recoveries for all parties
involved, and to manage all individual cases effectively with consistent
results.118  The Protocol seeks to achieve these goals by focusing on 
seven aims: (1) coordination, (2) communication, (3) information and data 
sharing, (4) asset preservation, (5) claims reconciliation, (6) maximization 
of recoveries, and (7) comity.119  After the Protocol lays out its purposes
and aims, it separately addresses: (1) Notice, (2) Rights of Official
Representatives and Creditors to Appear, (3) Communication and
Access to Data and Information Among Official Representatives, 
(4) Communication Among Tribunals, (5) Communication Among 
Committees, (6) Asset Preservation, and (7) Claims.  Each of these 
110. 
111. 
112. 
113. 
114. 
115. 
116.
 117. 
118. 
119. 
Id.
Id.
Protocol, supra note 2, at 2. 
Proposal, supra note 3, at 15. 
Id.
Id.
 See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 31, at 2221. 
Proposal, supra note 3, at 15. 
Protocol, supra note 2, at 2. 
Id. at 3. 
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sections will be addressed separately to examine its basis in modified
universalism and its contribution to efficient and successful proceedings. 
A. The Lehman Protocol’s Aims 
1. Coordination
The Protocol states that international cooperation and coordination of 
proceedings will allow for the orderly, effective, efficient, and timely
administration of proceedings in order to reduce the cost of proceedings
and maximize recovery for creditors.120 
2. Communication
The Protocol requires promotion of communication among all 
“Official Representatives and Committees,” and also requires direct
communication between courts whenever possible.121  The Proposal 
gives more insight into statutory provisions which should guide
communication.
The Proposal outlines certain “mandates for communication and 
cooperation between courts and foreign representatives” by citing 
statutory provisions.122  The Proposal specifically mentions UNCITRAL 
Model Law of Cross-Border Insolvency, articles 25 and 26, the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code §§ 1525 and 1526, and Guideline 2.1 from Communication 
and Cooperation Between Courts and Foreign Representatives.123 
These statutory provisions are cited as the authority which supports
inclusion of provisions about cooperation among courts and parties in 
the protocol.
3. Information Sharing
The Protocol requires that all relevant information be shared among
Official Representatives to promote effective, efficient, and fair
proceedings; and to avoid the unnecessary waste of time and resources 
which would result from parties having to duplicate each other’s efforts 
in information gathering.124 
120. Id.
121. Id.
 122. 
123. 
Proposal, supra note 3, at 37. 
Id.
 124. Protocol, supra note 2, at 3. 
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4. Asset Preservation 
The value of all of Lehman’s assets should be identified, preserved, 
and maximized for the collective benefit of all creditors and other 
interested parties.125 
5. Claims Reconciliation 
An important goal identified by the Protocol is the coordination of an
efficient and transparent claims process.  There should be an especially 
“consistent and measured” approach to calculating intercompany claims 
in order to avoid unnecessary intercompany litigation.126 
6. Maximize Recovery
The ultimate goal of bankruptcy law in any country is to maximize 
recovery for all creditors.  The Protocol explicitly recognizes this goal.127 
7. Comity 
The Protocol emphasizes the ability of each country to maintain their
independent jurisdiction, sovereignty, and authority.  Such a provision is 
especially essential in the Lehman Protocol due to the number of 
countries involved in proceedings. Prior to the Lehman Protocol, no 
protocol had been created where proceedings took place in more than
three countries.128  Courts in the Lehman proceedings will be even more
concerned about maintaining authority and independent jurisdiction over 
the subject matter in its own proceedings. 
B. Notice Provisions 
The Lehman Protocol designates email as the standard form of notice,
and requires Official Representatives to provide notice to any party and 
any Committee established in the proceedings of any “relevant matters
in which those parties have an interest.”129  Equal treatment of creditors
is a fundamental principle of modified universalism.  The Protocol’s 
125. 
126. 
127. 
128. 
129. 
Id.
Id.
Id.
Proposal, supra note 3, at 38. 
Protocol, supra note 2, at 3. 
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requirement of equal notice to all creditors is most likely influenced by
the Model Law’s focus on equal treatment of creditors, including equal 
notice. 
The Model Law recognizes that notice to creditors is crucial in a 
bankruptcy so that creditors can file their claims in a timely manner.130 
It acknowledges the importance of equal notice by requiring that foreign
creditors be given the same level of notice as domestic creditors at all
points where domestic creditors are required to be given notice.131 In 
fact, the Model Law requires that foreign creditors be given superior 
notice to domestic creditors in some situations.132  One such situation is
where the notice given to domestic creditors would not reach foreign
creditors equally well. For example, where notice by publication in a
domestic periodical is sufficient for domestic creditors, foreign creditors 
must be given individual notice.133 
The Protocol’s designation of email as the preferred form of notice 
effectively addresses the problems of unequal notice recognized by the 
Model Law and modified universalism.  Notice by email is one of the 
few forms of notice that will reach all creditors equally, regardless of
location.134  The designation of email as the single form of notice eliminates
problems of inequality of notice and simplifies the requirements for all 
parties because they need not worry about providing different forms of
notice depending on which parties are involved.
Equal treatment of parties is not only important to the Model Law for 
efficiency and fairness, but also to its level of successful adoption by
countries because no country would adopt a model law that disadvantaged 
its own creditors in certain situations.135  The Model Law has provisions
for equal treatment of creditors in three areas: (1) notice, (2) distribution 
of assets, and (3) protection under substantive law.136  The Lehman 
Protocol mirrors the Model Law in that regard by stressing the equal
rights of creditors in the areas of (1) notice, (2) filing of claims for asset
distribution, and (3) rights under substantive law—the right of creditors 
to appear in court. 
130. See Cronin, supra note 88, at 717. 
131. Model Law, supra note 87, at art. 14. 
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. While it is possible that some remote jurisdictions would not have email access, it 
does not appear as though any of the parties represented in the Lehman Protocol would
have this problem. 
135. See Cronin, supra note 88, at 717. 
136. Id.
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C. Rights of Official Representatives and Creditors to Appear
The Protocol establishes the right of Official Representatives to appear
in all proceedings.137  This provision, in effect, allows equal access for 
all parties to the substantive law governing a proceeding.  The right of
Official Representatives and creditors to appear is a fundamental principle
underlying the Model Law.138  The Model Law seeks to change a
country’s procedural bankruptcy laws rather than substantive bankruptcy
laws, and without a provision giving all parties equal access to substantive
law, the Model Law could not function.
After establishing the right of a party to appear in any proceeding, the
Protocol establishes the right to appear without submitting to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal governing the proceeding.139  This addresses 
an important criticism of universalism: universalism is a threat to countries’
sovereignty.140  A party’s right to appear at a proceeding without the risk
of becoming subject to another jurisdiction’s ruling, based on substantive
law different from that of the party’s home country, allows parties to 
fully participate in all proceedings without risking threats to sovereignty.
Inclusion of this provision in the protocol is of utmost importance 
because parties cannot be forced to participate in a protocol—and they
will only choose to participate if they find the terms to be agreeable.
The Protocol makes it more likely that parties will adopt it by addressing
what would probably be a main concern of any party: balancing the need
to appear at a proceeding with wariness of submission to a foreign 
court’s jurisdiction.
D. Communication and Access to Data and Information 
The Protocol instructs Official Representatives to “keep each other 
generally informed when appropriate of any relevant information and
material developments,” to “consent whenever possible to the sharing of 
information,” and not to unreasonably withhold consent.141  The Protocol
is careful, however, not to infringe on the substantive law of any country
by specifically not requiring data sharing that violates any country’s 
137. Protocol, supra note 2, at 4. 
138. Cronin, supra note 88, at 718. 
139. Protocol, supra note 2, at 4. 
140. See LoPucki, supra note 31, at 2221. 
141. Protocol, supra note 2, at 4. 
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substantive law.142  For example, the Protocol says that with respect to 
information that constitutes an attorney’s work product or falls under the 
category of privileged information, Official Representatives “may, but
are not obliged, to share such information with each other, subject to all
privileges under the applicable rules of evidence . . . and provided that 
sharing work product or privileged information shall not be deemed a 
waiver of any attorney-client privilege or work product protection” under
the applicable substantive law of any country.143  Because protocols in
general are only adopted by the free choice of parties involved, drafters 
of protocols must be careful to protect all parties’ ability to conform to
their country’s substantive law.  Otherwise, parties will be reluctant to
agree to protocols. 
The Protocol also requests that Official Representatives make
available to each other “any information that is publicly available” in
their jurisdiction, and further, “where permitted under applicable laws,
share non-public information with other Official Representatives, subject
to appropriate confidentiality arrangements and all privileges.”144  The
Protocol then gives examples of appropriate data sharing: (1) sharing by
read-only access all relevant information and data that a party has the 
right to disclose, and for which it does not have to pay; (2) providing
access to books, records, correspondence or other documents that belong 
to the debtor; (3) “coordinating in good faith the investigations of pre-
filing activities with any other Official Representative with an interest in
such activities;” and (4) “liasing” with other Official Representatives on 
matters concerning mutual interests, as long as the parties’ interests are
aligned.145 
These provisions concerning data sharing and communication are an
attempt to further one of the identified goals of this Protocol—and of all 
protocols in general—and of the Model Law: effective, efficient and 
timely administration of proceedings.  To further this goal, it is important to
conserve resources and time. It can be costly and difficult for parties to 
discover information from other jurisdictions, even if that information is 
public. Requiring Official Representatives to provide, upon request, any 
public information and possibly even non-public information benefits all 
parties involved because it allows proceedings to operate more 
efficiently.  The Protocol’s emphasis on communication and information
sharing is a logical extension of the Model Law’s focus on cooperation
between parties.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 4–5. 
145. Id. at 5. 
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E. Communication Among Tribunals and Committees 
The Protocol references Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court 
Communication in Cross-Border Cases (Guidelines), which is included 
in the appendix to the Protocol.146  These Guidelines were created by the
American Law Institute and the International Insolvency Institute as part
of the Transnational Insolvency Project, which resulted in Principles of 
Cooperation among the NAFTA Countries.147  In its introduction, the
Guidelines point to the need for cooperation and coordination between
courts in order to maximize assets for all creditors.148 
Cooperation is important in insolvency proceedings because such 
proceedings are “real time litigation” in the sense that urgent matters
depend on timely resolution of proceedings.149  Delay can cause a
debtor’s assets to lose value, thereby depriving creditors of maximum 
recovery.150  In tension with the need for timeliness is the fact that
miscommunication, misinformation, and misunderstanding between and
among courts and parties is common and causes unnecessary delay and 
expense.151  The Lehman Protocol’s inclusion of the Guidelines is
recognition of these issues, and will help the proceedings operate
efficiently and in a timely manner.
The introduction to the Guidelines urges courts and parties to apply its 
principles in a flexible way, stating that “the Guidelines are not meant to 
be static, but are meant to be adapted and modified to fit the circumstances 
of individual cases and to change and evolve . . . as the community gains 
experience from working with them.”152  This approach is fitting for
incorporation into a protocol, such as Lehman’s, because protocols
themselves are meant to be flexible documents reflecting the practical 
experience of parties.  The Protocol’s inclusion of flexible and adaptable 
principles will contribute to its success in governing the proceedings, 
146. See American Law Institute, Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court
Communications in Cross-Border Cases (2000), reprinted in Protocol, supra note 2, at 
Schedule A. [Hereinafter Guidelines for Court-to-Court Communication]. 
147. Id.
148. Id. at Introduction. 
149. Justice J.M. Farley, A Judicial Perspective on International Cooperation in 
Insolvency Cases, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12 (1998).  See also BUFFORD, supra note 7, at 
547. As opposed to “autopsy litigation,” where it does not make a difference whether a 
case is dealt with next week or next year. Id.
150. See Farley, supra note 149, at 12. 
151. Id.
152. Guidelines for Court-to-Court Communication, supra note 146, at Introduction. 
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especially since prior protocol has governed as many proceedings and
assets.
The Guidelines are made up of seventeen principles which can be 
applied to any international insolvency and even outside of the 
insolvency context.153  The principles allow for communication between 
almost all parties to an insolvency,154 and specify the proper means of 
communication to be used between parties.155  Guideline 9 allows courts
to conduct joint hearings by means of any two-way communication 
which enables the courts to simultaneously hear each other.  
The Guidelines are similar to the Model Law in that they do not 
attempt to change the substantive rights of parties.  Rather, the Guidelines 
simply seek to provide a procedural mechanism for communication
between courts in international insolvency cases.156  In fact, the Guidelines 
are closely aligned with the Model Law, and in its Introduction, the
Guidelines commended the Model Law for recognizing the importance 
of communication between courts.157 
The Model Law was one of the first bodies to recognize the need for
cooperation between international courts, coupled with equal emphasis 
on the need to maintain each country’s sovereignty.158  The Model Law
orders that courts shall cooperate “to the maximum extent possible” with 
foreign courts, either directly or through the administrators involved in
the proceedings.159  It then specifies a number of forms of appropriate 
cooperation, including: (1) communicating information, (2) coordinating
the administration of the debtor’s assets and affairs, (3) approving and 
implementing “agreements concerning coordination of proceedings”
(such as a protocol), (4) and coordination of concurrent proceedings
involving the same debtor.160  Therefore the Lehman Protocol’s incorporation 
of the Guidelines is in line with the Model Law’s modified universalism 
153. Id. at Judicial Preface.
154. For example, Guideline 2 allows for communication between courts in different
jurisdictions. Guideline 3 gives a court authority to communicate with 
Insolvency Administrators or authorized foreign Court Representatives (the equivalent of an
Official Representative in the Lehman Protocol).  Guideline 8 states that counsel for all 
parties should be allowed to participate in communications between a court, a foreign Court 
Representative, and an Insolvency Administrator.
155. For example, Guideline 6 provides that parties can communicate by sending,
transmitting, or delivering copies of any document, including formal orders, judgments,
opinions, reasons for decision, endorsements and transcripts of proceedings.  Guideline 7 
covers all two-way communications, such as by telephone, video conference, or through
“any other electronic means.”
156. Guidelines for Court-to-Court Communication, supra note 146, at Judicial Preface. 
157. Id.
158. See WESSELS, supra note 14, at 199. 
159. Model Law, supra note 87, at art. 25. 
160. Id. at art. 27. 
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approach, which emphasizes the importance of communication between
courts. 
F. Asset Preservation 
A widely recognized goal of bankruptcy is the preservation of a 
debtor’s assets in order to maximize recovery for creditors.161 The
Lehman Protocol devotes an entire section to this topic.  It provides that 
each tribunal should administer the assets subject to its jurisdiction.162  If
an Official Representative believes that a certain debtor may have a
material interest in a specific asset whose value or recovery is at risk,163 
the Official Representative may (and presumably should) notify that
debtor.164  This certainly furthers the spirit of cooperation and 
communication espoused by the Model Law and modified universalism.
Even further, if an Official Representative believes he has a claim to any 
asset which has been received by another debtor, or knows himself to
have improperly received an asset which should be in another debtor’s
possession, the Protocol demands cooperation in rectifying the situation.165 
G. Claims 
The Lehman Protocol states that when there is more than one 
proceeding related to the same debtor, including main proceedings 
(Plenary Proceedings) and non-main proceedings (Limited Proceedings), 
a creditor should only file a claim in the one proceeding designated by 
the debtor—the main proceeding in the debtor’s home country.166 
Further, actions should be undertaken—such as “adjust distributions”— 
to ensure that a creditor who has received payments on a claim in one
proceeding does not receive payments for the same claim in any other 
proceeding.167 
161. See, e.g. WESSELS, supra note 14, at 14. 
162. Protocol, supra note 2, at 6. 
163. An asset may be at risk because of (1) sale, abandonment, or other disposition
of the asset, (2) termination, suspension, or other transition of an employee managing the 
asset, or (3) commencement of any judicial or non-judicial proceeding affecting the asset. Id.
at 6.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 7. 
166. Id.
167. Id.
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This provision attempts to maintain equal treatment of creditors by
preventing any creditor from receiving more than his fair share of assets
by submitting the same claim in more than one proceeding.168 
Communication between courts will be essential to enforce this provision
because, without communication, courts will not know whether a creditor
has submitted the same claim in another proceeding.  Article 8.4 of the 
Protocol recognizes that communication among the parties is also 
essential to ensure equal distribution of assets.  It states that Official
Representatives should, where possible, “coordinate notice procedures 
and establish the same deadlines for the filing of claims” in each 
proceeding.169  Equal notice to creditors of deadlines for filing claims is 
fundamental because, before there can be fair distribution of assets,
creditors must know how to submit their claims properly.  The Protocol
models its claims system on the modified universalism approach used by
the Model Law. 
The Model Law recognizes “main” proceedings and “non-main” 
proceedings. This is similar to the universalism idea of one home country 
proceeding, instead of individual proceedings in each country. Under 
the Model Law, there can only be one main proceeding, and it occurs
where the debtor has the “centre [sic] of its main interests.”170  There is a
presumption that the debtor’s center of main interests lies where it is
registered as a corporation, but that presumption can be overcome by
evidence that the location of incorporation is not where the debtor has 
his main interests.171  If a debtor has an “establishment” in a foreign 
country, but not its center of main interests, then all proceedings in that 
country are designated as non-main proceedings.172  Similarly, the
Protocol separates proceedings relating to each debtor into Plenary
Proceedings and Limited Proceedings, which are “secondary or ancillary”
to Plenary Proceedings.173  These proceedings specified by the Protocol 
are different only in name to the main proceedings and non-main
proceedings of the Model Law.
The designation of a proceeding as main or non-main has crucial
consequences within the Model Law.  The recognition of a main proceeding 
results in a stay being issued against all individual proceedings against
the debtor and freezes all transfers of a debtor’s assets.174  A determination 
that a proceeding is non-main has less extreme consequences.  There are
168. Id.
169. Id. at 8. 
170. 
171. 
172. 
Model Law, supra note 87, at art. (17)(2)(a).
Id. at art. 16(3). 
Id. at art. 2.1. 
173. 
174. 
Protocol, supra note 2, at Appendix A. 
Model Law, supra note 87, at art. 20. 
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no mandatory actions taken when a proceeding is characterized as non-
main. All actions are within the discretion of the court.175  The court 
may choose to stay other individual proceedings, suspend the debtor’s
right to transfer any assets, or collect evidence, among other things.176 
Unfortunately, the Model Law does not address the critics of 
territorialism who point out that debtors may engage in forum shopping.177 
If there is more than one country where a debtor could have the main
proceeding, it is likely that he will determine which country’s substantive
law is most favorable to him and then establish the main proceeding in 
that country.  The law most favorable to the debtor is not always the law 
most favorable to creditors, so the ability of debtors to forum shop 
would be restricted in an ideal system.   
The Model Law does, however, contain some provisions to prevent 
forum shopping by creditors—a possibility in a pure territorialism 
system.  In such a system, it is sometimes possible for creditors who 
have received payment in a proceeding in one country to “hop” to 
another jurisdiction and receive another payment there, in effect getting 
more assets than are due to them.178  The Model Law prevents this by 
demanding equal payment among all creditors.  A creditor who has 
received payment in one jurisdiction cannot collect money in a different 
proceeding if similarly situated creditors have received proportionately 
less money.179 The Model Law addresses other weak points of a pure
territorialism system by focusing on recognition, access, and cooperation
between countries and representatives.180 
The Model Law requires a court to recognize foreign proceedings
once a foreign representative has filed the proper paperwork.  At that 
time, the foreign proceeding is characterized as main or non-main.  This 
characterization ensures unrestricted access for foreign creditors.  Once
the foreign proceeding has been recognized, the Model Law then seeks 
to integrate those two proceedings to achieve a fair and efficient result
by requiring cooperation between the two courts.181 The Model Law 
places a strong emphasis on the requirement of cooperation between
175. Id. at art. 21. 
176. Id. at 1. 
177. 
178. 
Cronin, supra note 88, at 721. 
Id. at 718. 
179. 
180. 
181. 
Model Law, supra note 87, at art. 32. 
Cronin, supra note 88, at 713. 
See Model Law, supra note 87, at Ch. IV (emphasizing importance of cooperation). 
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courts and representatives in order to achieve efficiency and fairness.
Another point central to the Model Law is the equal treatment of 
similarly situated creditors.182 
The Model Law also requires that a country’s foreign creditors be 
given equal treatment to domestic creditors under local substantive
law.183  This does not introduce any changes to a country’s substantive
law, but rather changes to procedural law to provide foreign creditors 
with the same rights under the substantive law as those provided to 
domestic creditors.  These changes to procedural law suggested by the 
Model Law work mainly by giving foreign creditors equal access to a 
country’s legal system: foreign creditors have equal rights to commence 
and participate in any proceeding.184  Another way the Model Law
ensures equal treatment for foreign creditors is through regulation of
discretionary relief given by a court.  Courts are required to consider the 
interests of all parties when they fashion any form of relief; they may
not protect domestic creditors at the expense of foreign creditors.185 
V. PRECEDENTS RELIED UPON BY THE LEHMAN PROTOCOL
Prior protocols only have narrow applicability to the Lehman Protocol
because the prior protocols have been limited in both the size of
proceedings and in the number of countries involved.186  Lehman  
Brothers is the largest bankruptcy in history, and its size alone makes it 
difficult to apply the principles relied upon in prior protocols.187  There 
are, however, prior protocols which can be applied to some extent. 
The protocol in the case of In re Maxwell Communication
Corporation188 was the first global plan for “orderly liquidation” that
had ever been achieved.189 In Maxwell, the court-appointed examiner
worked with administrators based in the United Kingdom to create a 
single unified plan of reorganization.190 Maxwell is important to the
Lehman Protocol in terms of precedential value because it was the first
cross-border protocol ever approved for use among two plenary
bankruptcy proceedings.  Further, Maxwell provides a useful demonstration 
of how avoidance rules—which often differ widely from country to
182. Id. at art. 13. 
183. Id.
184. Id.
 185. 
186. 
187. 
Model Law, supra note 87, at art. 22. 
Proposal, supra note 3, at 38. 
Id.
188.
1994).
189. 
190. 
 See generally In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp., 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Westbrook, supra note 9, at 2535. 
Proposal, supra note 3, at 38. 
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country—can be applied “sensibly” in an international insolvency
proceeding.191 
In Maxwell, the corporate debtor had its administrative center in 
London, but the company’s principal assets were located in the United 
States.192  This corporate structure not only led to the administration of 
bankruptcy proceedings in the United Kingdom, but also the filing of
chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States 193  Central to the case were
certain pre-filing payments made by the debtor to various European
banks.194  Those payments would have been avoidable under U.S. law, 
but were not avoidable under U.K. law.195  Parties could not agree over 
which law should apply because the application of U.S. law would 
benefit U.S. creditors by allowing greater recovery of assets, while 
application of U.K. law would benefit other creditors.  Through the 
unprecedented use of a protocol, which focused on harmonizing the
actions of the U.K. administrators and the examiner in the U.S. chapter 
11 case, the U.S. courts and parties were able to “take a worldwide view 
of the case, rather than a parochial one.”196  This resulted in an agreement 
between the parties to apply U.K. law.  The protocol stated as its
objective, that all parties should consult with each other and create 
“essentially similar arrangements” for a plan of reorganization.197  This 
objective was successfully realized, and for that reason, Maxwell opened
the door for future protocols and cooperation between private parties in
the international insolvency context. 
Without Maxwell, the Lehman Protocol could never have been
created. Maxwell did, however, leave many issues which are relevant to 
the Lehman case unanswered.198  While Maxwell provides the fundamental
 191. Westbrook, supra note 9, at 2531. 
192. Flaschen & Silverman, supra note 8, at 590.  Maxwell Communication Corp.
was a holding company based in the United Kingdom, with more than 400 subsidiaries
spread across the world.  Id. Primarily, the subsidiaries performed information services
and electronic publishing, as well as language instruction. Id.  Maxwell’s bankruptcy was 
sparked by the mysterious death of Robert Maxwell—he either fell from or was pushed
from his yacht.  Westbrook, supra note 45, at 2321.  His financial empire subsequently
collapsed within a matter of weeks.  Westbrook, supra note 9, at 2534.
 193. Westbrook, supra note 9, 2534.
194. Id. at 2535. 
195. Id. at 2536. 
196. Westbrook, supra note 45, at 2321. 
197. WESSELS, supra note 14, at 180. 
198. For example, the Maxwell protocol did not address matters of “ultimate proceeding
resolution,” such as an exit strategy and methods of distribution to creditors.  Flaschen & 
Silverman, supra note 8, at 591. Generally, Maxwell focused more closely on the issues 
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concept on which the Lehman Protocol is built, other earlier protocols 
addressed specific problems which may arise in the Lehman proceedings. 
The Proposal cites one specific problem in implementing the Protocol
in any civil law jurisdiction, as opposed to a common law jurisdiction.199 
Civil law judges may be restricted in their ability to take action not
explicitly authorized by the civil code, limiting their ability to act
pursuant to a privately agreed upon protocol.200  Two precedent protocols
may, however, provide guidance in solving this problem. 
In the case of In re Nakash, the first protocol between a common law 
country and a civil law country was created.201  This is important
precedent upon which the Lehman Protocol can rely because a number
of civil countries are involved in the Lehman proceedings.  Significantly,
civil law countries require that judicial action be taken only as
specifically authorized by statute.  Therefore, a civil law court cannot 
simply order and enter into a protocol agreement with a foreign court 
unless there is express statutory authorization to do so.  Very few, if any,
civil law countries have such specific statutory authorization.  In 
Nakash, however, the Israeli court gave tacit approval of the protocol 
without formal adoption of it.202 
In re Nakash dealt with the bankruptcy of an Israeli bank and Joseph 
Nakash, the bank’s former director.203  A conflict arose when the Israeli 
official receiver enforced a $160 million judgment by an Israeli court 
against Nakash’s assets, which existed in the United States and Israel.204 
The receiver’s action violated the stay imposed in Nakash’s U.S. 
bankruptcy case.  The U.S. and Israeli courts were able to resolve the
conflict through the use of a protocol.  In fact, Nakash was one of the 
first cases where the courts themselves, rather than the parties involved, 
expressed a desire for cooperation and communication.205  It was possible 
to create a protocol in this case, despite a civil law court’s need to find 
express statutory authorization for all actions, because the Israeli Court
adopted the protocol without formally approving the Nakash Protocol. 
Such a tactic could also work well in the Lehman setting. 
of preserving stability in the corporate debtor’s organization and asset preservation— 
both of which are specifically relevant to Lehman. Id.
 199. Proposal, supra note 3, at 37. 
200. Id.
201. In re Nakash, Case No. 94-B-44840 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1996), 
reprinted in Flaschen & Silverman, supra note 8, 612 [hereinafter Nakash Protocol]; see
also id. at 593. 
202. See id.
 203. WESSELS, supra note 14, at 181. 
204. Id.
205. Id. at 182. 
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VI. THREATS TO THE LEHMAN PROTOCOL
Ultimately, no matter how expertly a protocol is drafted, and no matter 
how well it should work in theory, a protocol is of no value if parties 
refuse to adopt it. Parties’ reluctance has not been a problem in the 
protocols mentioned in this article.  Yet, it is impossible to know how 
many attempted protocols have failed because parties refuse to accept
the process. Although the Lehman insolvency is far from an ultimate 
disposition, it is already apparent that some parties in the Lehman case
are reluctant to adopt the Protocol.  For example, Pricewaterhouse Coopers,
a major party in proceedings taking place in the United Kingdom, has 
refused to adopt the protocol.206 
The parties resisting the Lehman Protocol fear that its adoption would 
not be in the best interests of creditors, and that the Protocol could put
creditors in conflict with their own nation’s bankruptcy law.207  Tony
Lomas, the Pricewaterhouse Coopers partner dealing with the Lehman
bankruptcy, stated, “[t]here is a concern that there will be differences of
opinion, which could give rise to potential litigation between affiliates. 
We don’t want to be morally blocked from doing anything like that.”208 
Unfortunately, such a statement reflects a misunderstanding of the scope 
of the Protocol, which does not impose any moral duties, but rather 
provides guidelines for cooperation between parties.  If the Protocol 
fails, and parties cannot cooperate, the Protocol would have no bearing 
on any subsequent litigation.  Nevertheless, future protocols would be 
well advised to explicitly state the limits of their scope, so concerns like 
Lomas’ would not arise.
VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE PROTOCOLS
Future protocols based on modified universalism could benefit from
additional provisions which are contained in neither the Lehman 
Protocol nor the Model Law. The problem of forum shopping presented 
206. See, e.g., Philip Aldrick & Helia Ebrahimi, PwC Rejects Global Plan for Lehman
Recoveries, THE TELEGRAPH, May 26, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/ 
banksandfinance/5389607/PwC-rejects-global-plan-for-Lehman-recoveries.html. 
207. Id.
208. Id.
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by universalism is not fully addressed by modified universalism.209 
Forum shopping could be more efficiently thwarted if future protocols 
adopted formal procedures for deciding a debtor’s home country.210 
Developing guidelines to help accurately and reliably determine a 
debtor’s home country may not be easy, but doing so would increase 
predictability in international insolvency and would make it harder for 
all parties to engage in forum shopping.  Presently, the decision of
whether a proceeding is main or non-main is made within a few days of
the filing of a case.  This determination should be delayed somewhat, to 
allow all interested parties the opportunity to be heard and to allow the 
court to consider all evidence bearing on the issue.211  Further, notice of
the pending determination should be provided to all interested parties in
a timely manner, to allow them the opportunity to submit evidence.212 
Additionally, future protocols and the Model Law would be improved
by the provisions allowing for all of the legal entities in a large multinational
corporate group, such as Lehman, which constitute an “integrated 
economic unit” to file in the same venue.213  Almost all multinational 
corporations such as Lehman are corporate groups, rather than single 
corporations, and have multiple legal entities.214  The Model Law was
not, however, drafted with corporate groups in mind.  The Model Law 
requires that each legal entity of a corporate group be evaluated 
separately to determine its home country for purposes of characterizing a 
proceeding as main.215  The Model Law’s approach is problematic because
“a corporate group that is an integrated economic unit can only be 
reorganized or liquidated efficiently if it is done collectively for the
entire group.”216  Proponents of universalism and territorialism both
agree that future protocols and the Model Law would be improved if 
economically integrated entities of a corporate group had the same home 
country, while economically independent entities of a corporate group 
each had separate home countries.217 
209. See supra Part II.B.  Proponents of universalism do not have any strong arguments
in response to criticism of universalism because of the opportunities it creates for forum
shopping. They merely reply that forum shopping is not as big of a problem as some
think, and that changes will eventually be made to the Model Law and E.U. Regulations. 
210. See Bufford, supra note 10, at 131. 
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
 214. LoPucki, supra note 94, at 92. 
215. Bufford, supra note 10, at 136. 
216. Id.
 217. LoPucki, supra note 94, at 136. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Although Lehman bankruptcy “saga” has not yet concluded—the
Lehman bankruptcy’s full affect on creditors was still unclear upon 
publication of this article in 2011—it is clear that adoption of a protocol 
has provided for a more efficient process.218  Nevertheless, the size and 
scope of the Lehman bankruptcy filings have made adoption of a 
protocol more difficult, and undoubtedly issues will arise that have not 
been addressed by prior protocols.  Hopefully, courts and parties will be 
able to look back on the Lehman filing and the success—or lack
thereof—of its Protocol and glean principles to guide future international 
insolvency proceedings. 
218. See, e.g., Jim Boulden, Lehman Saga Still Being Unraveled in London, CNN.COM/
WORLD BUSINESS, Sept. 15, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/BUSINESS/09/14/lehman.
world.lomas/. 
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